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PROPOS D/I USAF AMENDMENTS  
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000700010005-7

TO

19 MARCH DRAFT OF NIE-37

1. Reference page 2, par. 2: Delete and substitute as follows:  
"As long as UN forces are committed to the defense of Taiwan, however, we believe it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt an assault on the island unless Soviet armed forces provide open air, submarine, and mine warfare assistance or furnish such assistance through the "volunteer" method sufficient to offset the effect of the participation of US forces in the defense. It is unlikely that the USSR would provide either type of such assistance unless the Kremlin were ready to accept considerable risk of general war between the USSR and the US, although they might assess that the risk would be less if "volunteers" were used. We believe, therefore, that the Chinese Communists will not attempt to invade Taiwan during 1951 unless the Kremlin as well as the Peiping regime is ready to accept the accompanying risk of general war with the US."

2. Reference page 2, par. 3: Change as follows: "The Chinese Communists probably will continue to maintain a military threat to Taiwan, will concentrate on attempting to weakening Nationalist defenses by subversion, and will try to exploit the Taiwan issue to ~~increase~~ promote anti-American feeling in China and confuse and divide the non-Communist world."

\*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

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Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest  
Date 12/15/84 Reviewer 001514

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3. Reference page 3, par. 4 (a): Delete the last sentence:

~~"Such a strategy would anticipate that the establishment of a foothold on Taiwan would weaken Nationalist morale and cause large-scale Nationalist defections."~~

4. Reference page 3, par. 4 (b): Delete and substitute as follows:

"Immediately preceding or accompanying the advance assault, ~~all available~~ any groups of Communist saboteurs and guerrillas on Taiwan would make a maximum effort to interfere with Nationalist defensive moves."

5. Reference page 4, par. 5 (a): Delete and substitute as follows:

"Approximately 400,000 field force troops are engaged in containing dissidents and bandits guerrillas on the mainland estimated to number more than 600,000 500,000."

6. Reference page 5, par. 7: Delete and substitute as follows:

It is estimated that <sup>probably</sup> ~~The Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF)~~ contains has at least 1200 active pilots and <sup>possibly</sup> ~~3000 pilots in training.~~ The CCAF is estimated to have has available to it approximately 650 aircraft of jet and piston fighter, ground attack, light bomber, and transport all types, of which ~~300~~ at least 250 are believed to ~~be in Soviet units deployed with the CCAF under direct Soviet control.~~ Soviet type jet aircraft have been reported in both the Shanghai and Canton ~~Soviet type jet aircraft have been reported in both the Shanghai and Canton areas.~~ ~~areas~~ The Chinese Communists have sufficient usable available airfields within effective fighter and light bomber range of Taiwan. However, since most CCAF aircraft are located in northeast China and in Manchuria, a major redeployment of air strength would be required before the Chinese Communists

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could make a ~~Approximate Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000700010005-7~~ in the Taiwan area. Moreover, in the absence of Soviet support on a large scale, losses due to combat attrition and maintenance difficulties would substantially reduce the combat effectiveness of the CCAF within a week of sustained operations."

7. Reference page 9, par. 13 (b): Delete and substitute as follows:

"The Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) has a reported over-all strength of 845 aircraft, of which only 345 are operational. There are no jet aircraft in the CNAF. ~~Although its morale has been reported to be fairly good, the CNAF would be relatively ineffective against Soviet-type jet fighters.~~ In its present state <sup>(defensive capability of the)</sup> status the CNAF has a very low relative combat capability to intercept and attack enemy aircraft and is not continuously prepared to provide adequate air defense for Taiwan against the type of attack the Chinese Communists are deemed capable of mounting. However, the CNAF ~~is~~ is believed to have the organizational structure and necessary personnel, including 1700 trained active pilots, to absorb and utilize additional equipment needed to <sup>improve its effectiveness as a force</sup> make it an effective force for the defense of Taiwan."

8. Reference page 10, par. 14: Add the following: "The Chinese

Nationalist Government has taken far-reaching steps to guard against Chinese Communist sabotage on Taiwan and, through strict surveillance and ~~terroristic~~ effective control methods, probably could prevent . . . ."

9. Reference page 11, par. 16: Add the following: "Given US support and barring direct participation of Soviet or "volunteer" forces in large numbers in an attack, . . . . ."

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10. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000700010005-7  
Reference page 13, par. 19: Delete and substitute as follows:

Soviet Union

"The USSR, while supporting Communist China's position, does not appear to share the zeal of the Chinese Communist leaders for the early conquest of Taiwan and might actually prefer continuation of the present impasse because it has a divisive effect on the Western Powers, and is useful as a focal point for Chinese Communist anti-Americanism, and provides an incentive for continuing Chinese operations in Korea despite heavy losses. The Kremlin might, depending upon its available resources, wish to have the Chinese Communists conquer Taiwan in order to breach the US Pacific line and obtain a staging area for further Communist offensive action to the south. But its approach to the problem of Taiwan will be governed by its general strategy in the East-West struggle and by the availability of Soviet military resources. ~~The Kremlin presumably is less concerned with the advantages or disadvantages of anti-Communist control of Taiwan than with the possibility that hostilities between the U.S. and China might spread and put the USSR under an almost unavoidable compulsion to come openly to the aid of China. Unless the Kremlin considers this possibility to be slight or is prepared for the eventuality of general war, the USSR is unlikely to support a Chinese Communist assault on Taiwan.~~"

11. Reference page 14,: Delete heading preceding par. 21, and change to precede par. 20: "PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN 1951."

12. Reference page 14, par. 20: Delete and substitute as follows:  
"As long as US forces are committed to the defense of Taiwan, however, we believe it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will attempt an assault

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on the island unless Soviet armed forces provide open air, submarine, and mine warfare assistance, or furnish such assistance through the "volunteer" method sufficient to offset the effect of the participation of US forces in the defense. It is unlikely that the USSR would provide either type of such assistance unless the Kremlin were ready to accept considerable risk of general war between the USSR and the US, although they might assess that the risk would be low if "volunteers" were used. We believe, therefore, that the Chinese Communists will not attempt to invade Taiwan during 1951 unless the Kremlin as well as the Peiping regime is ready to accept the accompanying risk of general war with the U.S."

13. Reference page 15, par. 23 (b): Add the following: "Attempting to expanding a network for subversive activity on Taiwan."

14. Reference page 15, par. 23 (d): Change as follows: "Trying to stimulate ~~stimulating~~ international disagreement over the disposition of the area and international criticism of US support of the Chiang regime."

15. Reference page, par. 23 (e): Change as follows: "Attempting to exploiting the Taiwan issue in connection with proposals for a peaceful settlement in Korea."

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